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A
procedure is presented for assessing the quality of safety management. It is based on a
set of questions concerning areas of relevance which have to be answered with value
statements. Since such statements are vague, they are represented by fuzzy numbers.
Hence they can be combined mathematically to judge the quality of management on the whole
as well as that of the different areas considered. In this way weaknesses can be identi® ed. The
procedure was applied to a hazardous installation allowing a pertinent evaluation to be made
within a tolerable amount of time. It is considered to have potential for replacing some of the
safety analysis and auditing procedures currently in use.
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INTRODUCTION
Safety is the result of a combination of good technical
design, quali® ed operation and organization. Whilst the
technical part has traditionally received much attention
this is not true to the same extent for the `softer’ aspects of
safety such as operational procedures and organization.
Nevertheless these areas are of increasing concern, a fact
which is highlighted by their inclusion in the new Seveso
directive1 .
Methods for assessing the quality of technical systems
and human error in operation and maintenance have
matured over the years and allow achieved standards to be
quanti® ed, whilst procedures to address the quality of safety
management are less developed. This is not surprising
since management of safety deals with its less tangible
part, namely the creation of a safety culture, which in the
terms of reference2 is de® ned as follows: `Safety culture is
that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organiza-
tions and individuals which establishes that, as an over-
riding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their signi® cance’ . Obviously with-
out the term `nuclear plant’ the de® nition is valid for any
technical installation.
Lees3 underlines the dif® culties involved in creating the
correct attitudes and advocates professionalism. Further-
more, he stresses the importance of strong leadership to
create and maintain a safety culture. According to Kenney4 ,
`leadership deals with understanding what the right course
of action is and catalyzing the organization to follow it’ . He
goes on to say `a major role of leaders is to de® ne what
constitutes excellence in their speci® c enterprise’ .
It is this excellence which should serve as a yardstick
for the quality of safety management. If this objective
is pursued, `quality’ has to be measured and compared
with excellence expressed in the same terms. However, not
all important indicators for the quality of safety manage-
ment are readily measurable. Whilst, for example, indica-
tors like the number of labour accidents, time lost due to
accidents and (if special provisions are made) the number
of near-misses are amenable to statistics, because they are
relatively frequent, major accidents are practically not,
because they are rare. However, a correlation does exist
between the level of minor accidents and that of major
accidents. The common factor is people, their attitude and
discipline3 .
The preceding statements characterize the setting for
the approach of assessing the quality of safety management
which is proposed in this paper. It addresses both the
measurable and unmeasurable aspects qualitatively and
strives to reduce subjectivity to a minimum.
It is recognized that the quality of safety management
is not only important in its own right but also in relation
to safety studies for technical systems which like, for
instance, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), assume
that during the lifetime of a plant its initial quality is
maintained. This assumption has a fundamental impact on
the results which are only valid if good `housekeeping’ can
be assured.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APPROACH
The starting point of the procedure is a check-list of
questions to be answered. Unlike in other cases these
questions are formulated such that they require more than a
simple `yes’ or `no’ answer. The reason is that the expert
knowledge of the analyst is appropriately exploited by
asking him to qualify the degree of compliance of each of
the topics examined. The quali® ers chosen are given in
Table 1. There are seven of them, a number which respects
the psychological rule-of-thumb that seven plus/minus
two grades may be distinguished.
There may be some argument about the areas to be
considered in safety management. Lees3 states that in the
strict sense all the topics dealt with in his encompassing
standard book might be included. The choice made for
the present purpose is inspired by a ® eld study. It covers the
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topics mentioned in Reference 1 supplemented by several
others which proved reasonable. Table 2 gives the list.
It is natural that not all the questions included in
these areas have the same impact. Some are more impor-
tant than others. The same holds true for the areas
themselves. In order to cater for this fact, weights are
introduced. They are re¯ ected by the three quali® ers given
in Table 3.
To facilitate weighting care has been taken to make the
composition of the areas of Table 1 as homogeneous as
possible.
Although the analyst will be perfectly capable of
assigning the weights it makes sense to base them on the
consensus of several analystsÐ for example, all members
of the safety departmentÐ and hence reduce the level of
subjectivity by interpersonal comparisons.
The elements described form the basis of a computer
program whose salient features are presented in the next
section.
IMPLEMENTATION
The procedure outlined in the previous section involves
value judgements. These are vague by their very nature. For
example, what is classi® ed as `good’ may well contain
elements of `average’ and `very good’ . This situation is
echoed by the theory of fuzzy sets, which allows natural
language variables to be represented in mathematical terms
and operations to be performed on them.
The functions representing the quali® ers and weights
have been ® xed by the author. They mirror the fact that
value statements are vague. However, the choice is unlikely
to re¯ ect any expert’ s concrete vagueness, since this varies
from one individual to another and depends on the question
to be answered. It is dif® cult to conceive that it can ever be
established empirically.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to account for vagueness,
since there seems to be some evidence that a higher degree
of response consistency is attained if the analyst is allowed
to give an imprecise verbal response about a fuzzy concept
than if asked to make a precise answer5 .
Given this situation, simplicity and ¯ exibility dictated the
choice of the functional shape. Hence triangular fuzzy
numbers were adopted to represent the linguistic terms
mentioned in Tables 1 and 3. This is in line with an approach
frequently used in fuzzy set modelling. The triangular fuzzy
numbers are described mathematically as follows6 :
Equation (1) is a fuzzy number of the LR-type, i.e.
L 0 R 0 1 and L, denoting the `left branch’ of the
function, and R, describing its `right branch’ , do not increase
on [0,¥]; m is the mean value of the number, a its left and
b its right spread. The spreads re¯ ect the vagueness of
the linguistic statements. The parameter values chosen to
describe the quali® ers of Table 1 are given in Figure 1 along
with their graphical representation.
The weights of Table 3 are described analogously with
the parameters given in Figure 2, where the shape of the
function is also shown.
Global quality assessments for the different areas and the
entire plant are desirable as a basis for decision, for instance,
on whether the management of an area or of the entire plant
is acceptable or not or where modi® cations are needed.
Furthermore, they allow valuations to be easily commu-
nicated to company executives or the authorities who can
then focus their attention on areas rated as lacking. The
relative merits of the different areas, which might be the
responsibility of different staff members, become evident.
If the assessment is repeated periodically,which is desirable,
evolution with time of the quality of the management
both for areas and the entire plant is visible at a glance and
prompts action, if necessary, directly focused on areas rated
as de® cient.
The global quality assessments are obtained here by
forming the fuzzy weighted average (cf. Reference 7). For
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Table 1. Quali® ers used
in answering questions.
· Extremely poor
· Very poor
· Poor
· Average
· Good
· Very good
· Excellent
Table 2. Areas for assessing the quality of
safety management.
(1) Policy
(2) Organization and personnel
(3) Hazard identi® cation and evaluation
(4) Operational control
(5) Management of change
(6) Planning for emergencies
(7) Monitoring performance and feedback
(8) Audit and review
(9) Protection from third party interference
(10) Standards and codes of practice
(11) Safety communication
Table 3. Quali® ers for
characterizing the impact
of different questions
and areas.
· Very important
· Important
· Less important
mA x mK m;a; b L LR
L
m x
a
max 0, 1
m x
a
x # m and a > 0
R
x m
b
max 0, 1
x m
b
x $ m and b > 0
1
area i we then have:
Ri
Ji
j 1
mAi, j x gBi, j y
Ji
j 1
gBi, j y
2
In equation (2) mA i , j are the quali® ers for the individual
questions (cf. Figure 1), gB i , j are the weights attributed to
them as de® ned in Figure 2, and Ji is the number of
questions belonging to area i. Summing over the areas i
(i 1, . . . , 11, cf. Table 2) we obtain the average for the
plant:
R
I
i 1
hBi y Ri
I
i 1
hBi y
3
where hB i are the weights assigned to the different areas
using the functions of Figure 2.
The operations of addition, multiplication and division
needed for evaluating equations (2) and (3) are fuzzy
number operations which are performed as explained in the
Appendix. They propagate the vagueness of the different
answers through the calculations, hence re¯ ecting them in
the ® nal result. Triangular fuzzy numbers are then obtained
which have to be assigned to one of the quali® ers from
Table 1. This process, called defuzzi® cation, is carried out
by calculating the Euclidean distance between the edges of
the resulting triangle and the quali® er triangles of Figure 1
and making the assignment to the quali® er such that this
difference becomes smallest. It should be noted that the
mean values as well as the spreads, which characterize
the vagueness, in¯ uence the outcome of this operation.
If the resulting fuzzy number from equation (2) or (3) is
denoted by K nR; dR; c R L LR and the quali® ers from Table 1 by
K mi;ai;bi L LR (i 1,¼, 7) the assignment of the result is
obtained from:
The quali® er i which makes Di a minimum is then used
to characterize the aggregated value.
An evaluation without weights is also possible. It results
in a corresponding simpli® cation of equations (2) and (3),
whose treatment then does not require any of the approxi-
mations mentioned in the Appendix.
As a basis for performing the above calculations the
analyst’ s ratings are input when the computer program
prompts the question. This information, along with the
corresponding rationale (cf. Table 4), is stored and may be
retrieved for later checks, for example by another analyst, or
comparison of the results after weaknesses have been
removed.
FIELD STUDY
The procedure was applied to a plant used for the
production of dinitrotoluol. Some 180 questions from
the areas stated in Table 2 were answered. These questions
were developed taking check-lists requiring `yes’ or `no’
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Figure 1. Representation of the quali® ers mA x as fuzzy numbers.
Figure 2. Representation of the importance of questions gB y and areas hB y as fuzzy numbers.
Di min
i 1,¼,7
mi nR
2 mi ai nR dR
2 mi bi nR c R
2 4
answers as a starting point. They formed the basis of
extensive industrial auditing experience in a company other
than that owning the dinitrotoluolplant8 . Table 4 gives some
examples of the questions.
The plant was globally rated as `very good’ . No
prominent areas for improvement were found. Slight ¯ aws
were identi® ed in the evaluation of `near misses’ and the
possibility of detecting minor leaks in the outdoor installa-
tions of the plant. Both were considered as `average’ and did
not substantially affect the ratings for their corresponding
areas.
Naturally, the weaknesses discovered re¯ ect the judge-
ment of the analyst or his interview partners from the plant.
They will only adequately represent the quality of the
management of the plant, if the essential points are covered
by the questionnaire and the questions are answered
truthfully and with expertise. In this sense the procedure
provides a guiding framework for assessment and enables
different plants to be analysed on the same footing.
The time required for the assessment was one week, about
the same period of time as needed for a conventional audit
of the plant. However, the analysis was judged to be
considerably more profound.
CONCLUSIONS
The method presented has proved useful in assessing the
quality of the safety management of a major hazardous
industrial installation. It was possible to identify weak areas
and to record all ® ndings in a way which provides the
necessary clarity both for communication and monitoring of
plant modi® cations. The expenditure in terms of invested
time was tolerable. The procedure was considered to have
potential for replacing some of the auditing and safety
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Table 4. Examples of questions, their quali® cation and rationale.
Area Question Rating Rationale
(1) How would you assess the coverage of safety Excellent Safety is treated in detail in company guide-
issues in the company guidelines? lines. There is a commitment to the principles
of `responsible care’ and `sustainable devel-
opment’
(2) How do you judge the average annual Very good Since 1994 there has been no change in
¯ uctuation of personnel? personnel; this guarantees that the
collaborators are familiar with the plant.
(3) How are completeness and quality of safety Excellent Several safety analyses were performed for
analyses for the plant assessed? the plant; all conceivable hazards were
analysed and measures were taken to reduce
them.
(4) How do you assess the degree of familiarity Excellent During a training period of six months plant
with critical steps in the process? personnel are familiarized with the process
and its critical steps.
(4) What is the quality and reliability of the Good The supply is provided by two separate grids;
of the electricity supply? however, failures have occurred.
(4) How do you judge the quality of instructions Excellent The manual for operation gives a detailed
for start-up and shutdown as well as for cleaning description of the procedures and draws
the plant? attention to possible risks and the necessary
precautions.
(5) How do you judge the completeness and updating Good Operation manuals and safety instructions
of the documentation (operation manuals, P&I are always updated. However, due to frequent
diagrams, etc.) modi® cations of the installations this does
not apply to the same extent to P&I diagrams.
(6) What is the quality of training for emergencies? Very good Emergency drills are carried out once a year
following legal requirements in co-operation
with the ® re brigade. The log-book prepared
during the drill is evaluated afterwards.
(7) What is the quality of the registration and Good In case of major occurrences a detailed
evaluation of abnormal occurrences? evaluation based on company guidelines is
carried out. However, there is a problem with
minor occurrences. The plant manager per-
forms a daily walk-through and personnel are
asked to report irregularities, a procedure
which probably does not provide a complete
picture.
(10) How do you judge the quality of protection Excellent The handling of hazardous substances is
measures and equipment in handling hazardous regulated by laws and ordinances; addition-
substances? ally there are internal company codes of
practice. Infractions are penalized.
(11) How do you judge the relation with the Good There is an ample record of unproblematic
competent authorities? co-operation with the authority for safety and
environment.
analysis methodologies presently used in the plant, because
it makes ef® cient use of existing expert knowledge and
hence proved to be more profound.
The method is ¯ exible and allows one to add questions to
existing areas as well as to introduce new areas covering
related topics, for example, environmental and quality
management.
APPENDIX: OPERATIONS FOR FUZZY NUMBERS
Drawing upon the extension principle of fuzzy sets (cf.
Dubois and PradeÂ9 ), the de® nitions of the operations used
for evaluating equations (2) and (3), which can be found in
any textbook on fuzzy sets, are recapitulated.
Addition
If two fuzzy numbersM K m;a;b L LR andN K n; c ; dL LR
are added we have
M K m;a;b L LR Å K n; c ; dL LR K m n;a c ;b dL LR
A1
where Å denotes addition. The resulting set is of the
LR-type as well.
Multiplication
The multiplication of two fuzzy numbers of the LR-type
does not result in an LR-type number, unless, as is done
here, an approximation is used.
If there are two positive fuzzy numbers, M
K m;a; b L LR > 0 and N K n; c ; dL LR > 0, which is true in
the present case, their multiplication gives, substituting
the quadratic term appearing after multiplication by the
corresponding linear expression9 :
M Ä N K m;a;b L LR Ä K n; c ; dL LR
K mn;mc na ac ;md nb bdL LR A2
i.e., a number of LR-type. Ä denotes the multiplication.
Division
Division is carried out forming the inverse of the
corresponding fuzzy number in the ® rst place, i.e.:
mA 1 x mK m;a; b L 1LR
L
m 1
x
a
L
mx 1
ax
1
x # m and a > 0
R
1
x
m
b
R
1 mx
bx
1
x $ m and b > 0
A3
Evidently the right branch of the function 1/x # m is now
described by L and its left branch 1/x $ m by R. In
addition, the function is no longer of triangular shape.
In order to arrive at such a shape the following approxima-
tions are used where x in the denominator is approximated
by 1/ m a , respectively 1/ m b . This assures coinci-
dence of the triangle edges with the corresponding values of
the original function1 0 .
mx 1
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a
m
x
<
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Using equation (A4) in equation (A3) gives:
M 1 K m;a;b L 1LR
<
1
m
;
b
m m b
;
a
m m a RL
M > 0 A5
an expression for the inverse which again is of the LR type.
The division is carried out by multiplyingwith the inverse
giving:
N ÄM 1 K n; c ; dL LR Ä K m;a; b L 1LR
<
n
m
;
nb mc
m m b
;
na md
m m a LR
M > 0, N > 0 A6
where the approximation used for deriving equation (A2)
has also been applied.
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